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Abstract
This paper presents a two stage stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium con-
straints (SEPEC) model. Some source problems which motivate the model are discussed.
Monte Carlo sampling method is applied to solve the SEPEC. The convergence analysis on
the statistical estimators of Nash equilibria and Nash stationary points are presented.
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1 Introduction
In our earlier work [41], we discussed a one stage stochastic Nash equilibrium model and investi-
gated sample average approximation (SAA) of Nash equilibrium and Nash stationary points. We
noted that the model may cover two stage stochastic Nash equilibrium model and included an
application of a two stage stochastic equilibrium program with equilibrium constraint (SEPEC)
model to study the competition of generators in the electricity wholesale markets with net-
work constraints. However, the work does not explore the unique structure/characteristics of
SEPEC model. On the other hand, the SEPEC model, as a natural extension of deterministic
EPEC models, has a number of potential applications in a wide domain in engineering design,
management and economics. This motivates us to write this note in an attempt to provide an
independent discussion of the model and yet not overlap with our earlier work.
Let us start with some literature review. Over the past few years, equilibrium programs with
equilibrium constraints (EPEC) and SEPEC have been developed as a new subject in optimiza-
tion primarily driven by applications in engineering design, management and economics. For
instances, Hu and Ralph [15] used EPEC to model bilevel games in a restructured electricity
market where each player faces a bilevel optimization problem; Hobbs, Metzler and Pang [14]
investigated an oligopolistic market economy consists of several dominant rms in an electric
power network, where each generating rm submits bids to an ISO, choosing its bids to maxi-
mize prots subject to anticipated reactions by rival rms, and hence the rms' decision problem
can be formulated as an EPEC. Yao, Oren and Adler [43] used SEPEC to model generator's
competition in a spot with newtwork constraints where the second stage equilibrium constraint
is used to characterize independent system operator's optimal decision making problem on gen-
erator's dispatch and power ow in the network. Zhang, Xu and Wu [44] developed a two stage
SEPEC model to study generator's competition in electricity forward and spot markets and
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1their interactions. Henrion and R omisch [13] proposed a two stage SEPEC model for studying
competition in electricity markets. The authors investigated M-stationary points of the SEPEC
model under the condition that the market demand in the spot market has a nite distribution.
Recently, Ehrenmann and Neuho [7] compared two market designs, the integrated market de-
sign and the coordinated transmission auction for electricity trade and transmissions. From the
mathematical perspective, the authors showed that the intergrated market design is an instance
of an EPEC where generators know that his output decisions will inuence the allocation of
transmission rights by the SO, and the model can be represented by a Stackelberg model.
Apart from the application in electricity markets, there emerges a trend of using EPEC and
SEPEC to characterize the two stage equilibrium problems in some general oligopoly markets
where a set of strategic rms or agents (called leaders) non-cooperatively optimize their expected
objective function anticipating the reaction of the remaining nonstrategic rms or investors
(called followers). Recent work in Su [38] rst investigated a deterministic EPEC, and showed
the existence of a two stage Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Pang and Fukushima [25] proposed an
iterative penality method for solving a generalized Nash equilibrium where each player solves a
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), and introduced a class of remedial
models for the multi-leader-follower games for the oligopolistic competition models in electric
power markets. For a typical two stage competition in the stochastic environment, DeMiguel
and Xu [5] developed a stochastic multiple-leader Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (SMS) model for a
homogeneous product (or service) supply market, and derived the existence and uniqueness of
the SMS equilibrium. More broadly, for the transportation systems, EPEC models have been
applied to analyze the competition behaviors of strategic users in the trac network by Yang,
Xiao and Huang [42]. In a recent work, Koh [17] investigated the potential for implicit collusions
between users in the trac network, and obtained an EPEC model where every players are
constrained by a variational inequality. EPEC models have also been used for a game-theoretic
analysis of the implications of overlay networks trac of internet service providers (ISP) in
Wang, Chiu and Lui [36].
Along with the increasing interests of modelling issues on EPEC, there synchronically emerges
a volume of literature on employing the mathematical programming and game-theoretic analysis
to investigate the behaviors of players and the properties of equilibrium in EPEC models. One
of the natural questions arising from the EPEC problems is on the existence of Nash equilibrium
of these two stage problems, where related results have been well established for some cases with
particularly structured objective functions. See [5, 25, 38, 44] for a set of two stage equilibrium
problems. However, it is well known that, for some general cases, EPECs may not have any
global Nash equilibrium. Instead, several alternatives of global Nash equilibrium are introduced
for describing players' strategic behaviors within a local feasible set. Hu and Ralph [15] intro-
duced a set of new concepts as local Nash equilibria and Nash stationary points for EPEC for
a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of electricity markets with locational marginal
prices. On the other hand, within the framework of Mordukhovich coderivatives, Mordukhovich
[21, 22] rst investigated the necessary optimality conditions of M-stationary points for EPECs.
Moreover, Outrara [23] addressed a set of necessary conditions on the stationary points and the
local equilibria of EPEC models in the term of coderivatives.
In this paper, we are concerned with the numerical methods for solving the two stage SEPEC
models. We analyze the convergence of statistical estimators of Nash equilibria and Nash sta-
tionary points obtained from solving the sample average approximation problems. In the case
2when we obtain a stationary point by solving the sample average approximation, we investi-
gate the convergence to Nash-C-stationary points of the true problem rather than weak ones
investigated in [41].
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a description
and some properties of our model followed with the uniqueness of the second stage equilibrium.
In Section 3, we present some source problems which motivate the EPEC model. In Section
4, we formulate the sample average approximation of our problem and show the convergence
properties of the SAA estimators of Nash equilibria and Nash-C-stationary points, and draw
some concluding remarks in Section 5.
Throughout this paper, we will use the following notation. All vectors are thought as column
vectors and T denotes the transpose operation. For x;y 2 IRs, xTy denotes the scalar products
of two vectors x and y, kxk denotes the Euclidean norm. When D  IRs is a nonempty
compact set of vectors, we use the notation k  k to denote kDk := maxx2D kxk: Moreover,
d(x;D) := infx02D kx   x0k denotes the distance from point x to set D. For two compact sets
D1 and D2,
D(D1;D2) := sup
x2D1
d(x;D2)
denotes the deviation from set D1 to set D2 (in some references [12] it is also called excess of
D1 over D2), and H(D1;D2) denotes the Hausdor distance between the two sets, that is,
H(D1;D2) := max(D(D1;D2);D(D2;D1)):
Moreover, we use D1 +D2 to denote the Minkowski addition of D1 and D2, that is, D1 +D2 =
fx+y : x 2 D1;y 2 D2g. We also use B(x;) to denote the closed ball with radius  and center
x, that is B(x;) := fx0 : kx0  xk  g. When  is dropped, B(x) represents a neighborhood of
point x. We also use B to denote the unit ball in a nite dimensional space.
2 The model
Let Xi, i = 1;2;:::;M, be a nonempty, closed and convex subset of IRmi and X i := X1
Xi 1Xi+1XM denote the Cartesian product of the sets except Xi. Let X = XiX i.
We consider the following stochastic equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC):
nd x := (x1;x2; ;xM) 2 X and y() such that for i = 1;2;:::;M, (xi;y()) solves the
following problem:
min
xi2Xi;y()
E[fi(xi;x i;y(!);(!))]
s.t. 0 2 H(x;y(!);(!)) + NQ(y(!)); a.e. ! 2 
;
(2.1)
where x i 2 X i, fi : IRm1    IRmM  IRk  IRd ! IR is a Lipschitz continuous function
but not necessarily continuously dierentiable,  : 
 !   IRd is a random vector dened on
probability space (
;F;P) with support set , and E[] denotes the mathematical expectation
with respect to the distribution of . The equilibrium constraint in (2.1) is represented by a
parametric variational inequality problem (VIP), where y() is the prime variable, and x and
(!) are treated as parameters, H : IRmIRkIRd ! IRk is a vector-valued continuous function,
Q is a nonempty, convex and closed subset of IRk, and NQ(y) is the normal cone to Q at y,
3which is dened in as follows:
NQ(y) :=
( 
 2 IRk : T ( y   y)  0;8 y 2 Q
	
; if y 2 Q;
;; if y = 2 Q.
(2.2)
Problem (2.1) is a two stage SEPEC: at the rst stage, decision maker/player i, i 2 f1; ;Mg,
chooses an optimal value xi 2 Xi that maximizes the expected value of fi under Nash conjecture
(for xed x i 2 X i). At the second stage for the given x and a realization of the random vector
, player i nds an optimal y(x;) that solves the following
min
y2Q
fi(xi;x i;y;)
s.t. 0 2 H(x;y;) + NQ(y):
(2.3)
To ease the notation, in some parts of this paper we will write (!) as  and the context will
make it clear when  should be interpreted as a deterministic vector. Let us use vi(xi;x i;) to
denote the optimal value function of the second stage problem (2.3). Then (2.1) can be written
in an implicit form under some moderate conditions as
min
xi2Xi
E[vi(xi;x i;(!))]; (2.4)
where \implicit" means that (2.4) does not include the details of the second stage problem.
2.1 A discussion of the SEPEC model
Let Y (x;) denote the set of solutions to the variational inequality problem
0 2 H(x;y;) + NQ(y); (2.5)
Then we can rewrite the second stage optimization problem (2.3) as
min
y2Y (x;)
fi(xi;x i;y;) (2.6)
At this point, it might be helpful to give some practical interpretation of problem (2.6): here an
optimal equilibrium from Y (x;) is not up to the decision maker i to choose. The mathematical
formulation only represents player i's optimistic attitude towards a possible equilibrium outcome
at scenario , in other words, player i anticipates a best equilibrium outcome which minimizes his
objective function fi(xi;x i;y;) at scenario . To properly dene vi(xi;x i;) mathematically,
we let vi(xi;x i;) = +1 if the corresponding equilibrium at the second stage does not exist, i.e.
the corresponding variational inequality constraint in (2.3) does not have any solution. Then,
given that the rivals' decisions are xed at x i, decision maker i's expected prot at the rst
stage can be formulated as
^ #i(xi;x i) := E[vi(xi;x i;(!))];
or equivalently
^ #i(xi;x i) = E

min
y(!)2Y (x;(!))
fi(xi;x i;y(!);(!))

: (2.7)
4If all decision makers are optimistic, then the SEPEC problem can be formulated as follows:
min
xi2Xi
E

min
y2Y (x;(!))
fi(xi;x i;y;(!))

: (2.8)
Under some moderate conditions, (2.8) coincides with (2.1), see Proposition 5 in [32, Chapter
1].
Let us now consider an opposite case when player i is pessimistic. In such a case, his second
stage decision problem can be formulated as
max
y2Y (x;)
fi(xi;x i;y;); (2.9)
which means that, in making his decision for minimizing E[fi(xi;x i;y(!);)] at the rst stage,
decision maker i expects a worst a second stage equilibrium outcome y(!) 2 Y (x;(!)) which
maximizes fi(xi;x i;y(!);). Denote by  vi(xi;x i;) the optimal value function of decision
problem (2.9). Then player i's expected objective function can be written as
 #i(xi;x i) := E[ vi(xi;x i;(!))]; (2.10)
where  vi(xi;x i;) = +1 if Y (x;) = ;. If all decision makers are pessimistic and try to hedge
against a worst possible equilibrium at the second stage, then the SEPEC model becomes: nd
x = (x1; ;xM)
T and y() such that for i = 1;2;:::;M, (xi;y()) solves the following problem:
min
xi2Xi
E

max
y2Y (x;(!))
fi(xi;x i;y;(!))

(2.11)
where each decision maker solves a min-max problem.
There could be other cases when some generators are optimistic while others are pessimistic
or some decision maker do not really have an extreme view about the future equilibrium. In this
paper, we will simplify the discussion by considering the case when the equilibrium problem has
a unique solution and subsequently the minimization process in (2.7) can be dropped.
2.2 Uniqueness of the second stage equilibrium
In the remainder of this section, to complete the statement in Section 2.1, we present some as-
sumptions to guarantee we discuss sucient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium problem (represented by VIP (2.5)) at the second stage and the Lipschitz con-
tinuity of the optimal value functions vi(x;) at the second stage. Based on these assumptions,
we can proceed to investigate the rst order equilibrium conditions of the SEPEC problem (2.1)
and its sample average approximation (4.30) in terms of Clarke generalized gradient in Section
4.
First, let us look at the solution set Y (x;) of VIP (2.5):
0 2 H(x;y(!);(!)) + NQ(y(!)); (2.12)
and decision maker i's objective function fi(xi;x i;y(x;);) at every scenario  2  for i =
1;2;:::;M.
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problem (2.5), which can be guaranteed by the strict monotonicity of mapping H(x;y;) for
any x 2 X and a.e.  2 , which is equivalent to the strict concavity of function Ri(yi;y i;x;)
with respect to yi for any xed y i and i = 1;2;:::;M. Here, we present the assumptions on
the strict monotonicity of mapping H(x;y;) as follows.
Assumption 2.1 For i = 1;2;:::;M and almost every  2 ,
(a) H(x;y;) is a Lipschitz continuous function of (x;) on X   with a Lipschitz constant
independent of y.
(b) H(x;;) is uniformly strongly monotone on set Q, that is, for any given x and  2 ,
there exists a constant c > 0 such that
(H(x;y0;)   H(x;y;))T(y0   y)  cky0   yk2; 8y0;y 2 K: (2.13)
(c) fi(;x i;;) is Lipschitz continuous on Xi  Q with modulus i(), that is, for all i =
1;2;:::;M,
jfi(x0
i;x i;y0;)   fi(xi;x i;y;)j  i()
 
kx0
i   xik + ky0   yk

;
where E[i()] < 1.
Under Assumption 2.1 (b), it follows by virtue of [10, Theorem 2.3.3]) that the VIP (2.5) has
a unique solution for every given x and . Moreover, under Assumption 2.1 (a) and (b) we can
show the Lipschitzness of vi(;x i;) which will be used in the asymptotic analysis of sample
average approximate Nash equilibrium in Proposition 4.1.
Lemma 2.1 Under Assumption 2.1, for every xed x i 2 X i and a.e.  2 , vi(;x i;) is
Lipschitz continuous on Xi with modulus 0
i(), where E[0
i()] < 1.
Proof. Under Assumption 2.1 (b), it follows from [10, Theorem 2.3.3 (c)] that the variational
inequality
0 2 H(x;y;) + NQ(y)
has a unique solution y(x;) which is Liptschitz continuous on X with a constant modulus.
Moreover, under Assumption 2.1 (c), Fi(xi;x i;;) is Lipschitz continuous on Q with modulus
i(), where E[i()] < 1. Consequently,for i = 1;2;:::;M, there exists a 0
i() such that
vi(;x i;) is Lipschitz continuous on Xi with modulus 0
i(), where E[0
i()] < 1.
3 Source problems
A number of applications of two stage stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium con-
straints arise from a diversity of sources. In this section, we list a few examples.
63.1 Stochastic bilevel games
It is well-known that bilevel programming is closely related to MPEC through KKT conditions
at the second stage. It is therefore no surprise that stochastic bilevel games provide rich problem
sources for the SEPEC. Consider a two stage stochastic Nash game which consists two sets of
players: a set of M players who compete at the rst stage and a set of K players who compete
at the second stage the decisions of players at the rst stage at the rst stage are disclosed and
exterior uncertainty (such as market demand) is realized. Mathematically, we can formulate
this kind of game as follows:
8
<
:
min
xi2Xi;y()
E[fi(xi;x i;y(x;(!));(!))]
yj(x;(!)) solves min
yj2Qj
Rj(yj;y j;x;(!)); forj = 1;:::;K; a.e.! 2 
:
(3.14)
The stochastic multiple leader-followers game investigated by DeMiguel and Xu [5] is a typical
example of this type two stage stochastic bilevel game.
Assuming that for j = 1;2;:::;K, function Rj : IRkj IRk kj IRm ! IR is continuously
dierentiable w.r.t. yj on a nonempty convex and closed subset Qj  IRkj, Q j := Q1   
Qj 1  Qj+1    QK, and k =
PK
j=1 kj, the we can characterize the optimality condition of
each player at the second stage through a generalized equation and combining them gives
0 2 ryR(x;y;) + NQ(y); (3.15)
where ryR(x;y;) := (ry1R1(y1;y 1;x;); ;ryKRK(yK;y K;x;))
T. Under some convex-
ity conditions of the objective functions, it is well-known that a solution y(x;) is a Nash
equilibrium at the second stage if and only if it is a solution to the generalized equation (3.15).
Consequently we can reformulate the stochastic bilevel game (3.14) as the following two stage
SEPEC:
min
xi2Xi
E[fi(xi;x i;y(x;(!));(!))]
s.t. 0 2 ryR(x;y(x;(!));(!)) + NQ(y(x;(!))); a.e. ! 2 
:
Note that the two stage stochastic bilevel game model (3.14) may cover the capacity expan-
sion model considered by G urkan and Pang [11] where game at the rst stage is viewed as a
competition on long term capacity investment at present and second level game as short term
competition in future once the capacity expansion is completed and exterior uncertainty is re-
alized. In this case players are two stages may be identical. Note that (3.14) can also be used
to model competition in forward-spot electricity markets where generators compete at the rst
stage in the forward market for long term contracts and then compete for dispatch at spot
markets on daily basis, see [44].
3.2 Capital Tax Competition
The enforcement of an eective taxation on savings income has been a long-standing issue both
in policy and in academic debates, see [8, 9]. Along with the globalization of the capital market,
the tax can be easily evaded if the residence country is unable to monitor the investors' foreign
interest incomes, where the countries are linked through perfect capital mobility. These capital
links between countries may result in a very complex investment network. Even for a two country
7economy the ows of real and nancial capital might induce a complex system of transactions
under the dierent tax structures of both countries. In this subsection, we consider a capital
tax competition between the national tax authorities in two countries, denoted by i and j,
respectively.
The analysis of this capital tax competition employs a two stage stochastic equilibrium model.
At the rst stage, we assume that each tax authority of country, i or j, has three dierent tax
instruments. We give the tax instruments set by tax authority of country i (tax authority i) for
example:
(a) The rst tax instrument is a wage tax rate tw
i at which it taxes wage income wili. Note
that, in most of practical capital markets, wage rate wi and labor supply li may be aected by the
dierent amount of total investment level in country i, and hence we can rewrite them as wi(si)
and li(si), where si denotes the amount of capital invested in country i. Here, we set si being the
sum of si
i, the amount of capital invested in country i by residents at home (i.e. country i), and
si
j invested by the investors from abroad (i.e. country j). Moreover, the wage rate in a country
is usually set for a long term and hence independent of the global economic scenario . On the
other hand, the labor supply level uctuates along with the change of economic environment
and hence we assume that it is a function of scenario , denoted by li(si;).
(b) The second tax instrument the authority might choose is on the capital income of residents
where we denote its rate by tr
i. By assuming the perfect information sharing between the tax
authorities of the two countries, then the tax base can be formulated as
R()si = R()(si
i + s
j
i); (3.16)
where R() is the global return rate to the investment, that is, the return for every unit capital
invested in either countries, and is varied by the random shock  in the capital market. Since in
this subsection, we focus our investigation on the taxation problem, we generally assume that
the global return rate for the investment in each country are the same. In (3.16), si is the
amount of capital invested by residents at country i and is the sum of si
i and s
j
i where s
j
i denotes
the amount of capital invested by the residents at country i into the market in country j.
(c) Third, a government may tax the capital income generated at home on a source basis,
ts
i, where the tax base can be calculated as
R()si = R()(si
i + si
j); (3.17)
which includes the return of the investment by the residents at country i and from abroad, i.e.
country j. Similarly as in country i, we denote the tax instruments set by the tax authority j
as tw
j ;tr
j and ts
j, respectively.
Diering from the discussion in [8, 9], in the model, we rst consider the strategic behaviors
of the representative investor in each country. The representative investor (or consumer) in
country i maximizes a well-behaved utility function #i(ci1;ci2;li;), where ci1 and ci2 are the
consumption levels before and after the investment period. Denote the endowment obtained by
the investor by ei. After the realization of uncertainty  in the capital market, the investor in
country i needs to decide the proportion of ei to be consumed, ci1, or saved, si = si
i +s
j
i, where
si = ei   ci1. Because the decision on ci1 is made after knowing , consumption level ci1 is
aected by the uncertainty in the capital market and hence can be taken as a random function
8of , which is implied by the fact that the consumption level of investors i at country i uctuates
as a response to dierent economic situations in the capital market. Moreover, ci2 denotes the
consumption level after the return of the investment and can be formulated as
ci2(si
i;s
j
i;si
j;;tr
i;ts
i;ts
j) = wi (si)li

si
i + si
j;

+ [1 + R()(1   tr
i   ts
i)]si
i
+
h
1 + R()

1   tr
i   ts
j
i
s
j
i;
(3.18)
where the three terms in the righthand of (3.18) are the wage income, the post-tax income from
the home investment, and the post-tax income from the abroad investment, respectively. Note
that, in (3.18), tr
i +ts
i and tr
i +ts
j are the eective tax paid by the presentative investor at country
i on its capital income from country i and country j, respectively. By incorporating ci1 and
ci2 into the investor's utility function, for a realized market scenario , the decision problem of
the representative investor in country i is to choose the amounts of si
i() and s
j
i() to maximize
their utility function. Assuming that the realization of the uncertainty in the capital market
is  and the investor in country j rationally x their optimal investment at

s
j
j();si
j()

, the
representative investor in country i determines its investment policy by solving the following
problem,
max
si
i2Si
i;s
j
i2S
j
i
#i

ei   si
i   s
j
i;ci2(si
i;s
j
i;si
j;;tr
i;ts
i;ts
j);li

si
i + si
j;

;

; (3.19)
where Si
i := [0;  si
i] and S
j
i := [0;  s
j
i], and  si
i and  s
j
i are the upper bounds of investments si
i and s
j
i.
By assuming the convexities of functions li(;) and #i(ci1;ci2;li;), we can show the existence
and uniqueness of the investment equilibrium of the investors' competition in the capital market
at almost every scenario .
Consequently, the second stage equilibrium problem is: for tax instruments ti and tj xed at
the rst stage and the realization , nd an equilibrium (si;sj) solves the following parametric
equilibrium problem,
max
sk2Sk
#k

ek   sk;ck2(sk
k;sk0
k ;sk
k0;;tr
k;ts
k;ts
k0);lk
 
sk;

;

; (3.20)
where sk 2 Sk = Sk
k Sk0
k , k = i;j and k0 6= k 2 fi;jg. In (3.20), t := (ti;tj) and  are treated as
parameters. Therefore, the competition between the representative investors at country i and
j can be taken as a Cournot-type game, and the equilibrium to problem (3.20) is a function of
t and  which can be specied as sk(t;) for k = i and j. Then, we can rewrite (3.19) as the
following general equation form,
0 2 H(s(t;);t;) + NS(s(t;)); (3.21)
where s(t;) = (si(t;);sj(t;)), and feasible set S := Si  Sj.
Assuming the perfect information sharing between the two countries, we have that each
national authority determines its tax rates by aiming at the maximization of its expected utility
function which consists of two parts: one is the expected return of its representative investor in
the capital market, and the other is the production capacity of country i, denoted by gi, which
is seen as a function of the total tax revenue in the country. Consequently, at the rst stage,
given that tax authority j's optimal tax policy is rationally xed at t
j, the decision problem of
tax authority i can be formulated as:
max
ti
E[i(ti;t
j;si(ti;t
j;);sj(ti;t
j;); )];
s.t. tw
i 2 [0; tw
i ]; tr
i 2 [0; tr
i]; ts
i 2 [0; ts
i]:
(3.22)
9where the objective function i

ti;t
j;si;sj;

of tax authority i is dened as
i (ti;tj;si;sj;) := #i

ei   si;ci2(si
i;s
j
i;si
j;;tr
i;ts
i;ts
j);li
 
si;

;

+u(gi (ti;tj;si;sj;));
(3.23)
u() is the utility function of the production capacity gi, and the production capacity gi is a
function of the tax revenues as follows
gi (ti;tj;si;sj;) = tw
i wi()li
 
si
i + si
j;

+ (ts
i + tr
i)R()si
i + tr
iR()s
j
i + ts
iR()si
j:
Moreover, in decision problem (3.24), the variables si(ti;tj;) and sj(ti;tj;) are solved from
general equation (3.21) for any xed ti, tj and the realization . By inclusively taking the
investors' reactions at the second stage into consideration, tax authority i's decision problem
can be written as,
max
ti
E[i(ti;t
j;si(ti;tj;);sj(ti;tj;); )];
s.t. tw
i 2 [0; tw
i ]; tr
i 2 [0; tr
i]; ts
i 2 [0; ts
i];
0 2 H(s(t;);t;) + NS(s(t;)); a.e.  2 :
(3.24)
which implies that the capital tax competition can be formulated as an SEPEC model.
3.3 Oligopolistic transit market
In this subsection, we look at a two stage stochastic equilibrium problem for a urban transit
systems. Over past twenty years, the deregulation of urban transit systems has become an ap-
pealing alternative to centralized municipal transit policy. In a recent paper [45], a deterministic
network equilibrium model with a two stage framework for a deregulated transit system is pro-
posed to describe the fare competition between transit operators where every operator takes
into account passengers' responses in making its decision. At the rst stage, by assuming that
its rivals rationally choose their optimal decisions on their fare structures, each of the transit
operators can determine its own fare structure in order to maximize its expected revenue, where
in the urban transit system, the transit operators' revenues depends on the number of passen-
gers using their lines. Then, at the second stage, every passenger reacts to the transit operators'
fares in the urban transit system.
Stochastic network equilibrium models are widely applied for predicting trac patterns in
the transportation networks at the second stage, in which the trac ow in the transportation
network is characterized by stochastic user equilibrium for every possible scenario. In this two
stage model, the interaction between the transit operators and the passengers is described in
the form of Stackelberg game, that is, at the rst stage, in making the decision, every operator
takes the passengers' reaction to its fare plan at every trac scenario into account. On the other
hand, the competition between the transit operators can be seen as a Cournot game where each
operator makes its decision regarding that its rivals' fares are xed.
In the problem, the urban transit network is denoted by a directed trac network as G =
(N;A) where N is the set of nodes (or transfer stations) and A is the set of links (or route
sections). At the rst stage, the transit competition is portrayed as M player (transit operator)
noncooperative game of deciding the fares for a set of transfer lines connecting origin-destination
10(OD) pairs w for w 2 W where W is the set of all OD pairs, and Rw is the set of all routes
joining OD pair w. In the rst stage equilibrium, transit operator i makes its decision on the fare
of the route connecting OD w 2 W, denoted by pi
w =

pi
r
	
r2Rw, so as to maximize its expected
prot, where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of the trac uncertainty
 2 . Note that, in making the decision at the rst stage, each operator predictively takes
into account the passenger ow in every route of the trac network at every possible scenario
, where the ows are determined by solving a stochastic user equilibrium model at the second
stage.
At the second stage problem, with each xed transit fare structure and a realized trac
uncertainty , the stochastic user equilibrium condition can be mathematically expressed to
determine the ow on every route r serving an OD pair w 2 W for r 2 Rw: Denote by yr() the
trac ow on path r at trac scenario . Given that the realization of trac uncertainty is 
and operator i's fare for route r is pi
r for all r 2 Rw and w 2 W, the user (passenger)'s travel
cost function on path r can be written as
ur(y;pw;) = dr(pw) + Cr(y;pw;) + 0 (tr(y;)   w)
2 ; (3.25)
where y := fyrgr2Rw, pw := (p1
w; ;pM
w )T, pi
w =

pi
r
	
r2Rw. In (3.25), dr(pw) represents the
composite of attributes such as the travel fare for a certain distance which is independent of
time/ow, Cr(y;pw;) denotes the stochastic travel cost on path r which is implicitly determined
by the ows on all arc r which may depends on the volume of the passenger ow between OD
pair w, the fares of all operators, and changes for dierent trac scenario. tr(y;) denotes the
stochastic travel time on path r and w denote the expected travel time between OD pair w.
Furthermore, in (3.25), 0 is the penalty coecient when the actual travel time on w deviates
the scheduled time w. Then, by assuming the total population traveling between OD pair w is
qw being a deterministic parameter, the feasible set of the trac ow across the whole network
can be expressed as
Q =
(
y :
X
r2Rw
yr = qw; 8w;yr  0;8r
)
which is a convex set. Moreover, at the second stage, the stochastic user equilibrium is dened
as the state when no passenger believes that he can reduce his perceived travel cost by chang-
ing route unilaterally. Hence, we can write this equilibrium condition as following variational
inequality problem: nd y such that
(
y (u(y;p;)   u(y;p;)) = 0; 8y 2 Q; w 2 W
y  0; u(y;p;)   u(y;p;)  0;
(3.26)
for almost every  2  and xed fare p =

pi
w; i = 1;2;:::;M; w 2 W
	
, where
y (u(y;p;)   u(y;p;)) :=
X
r2Rw
y
r (ur(y;p;)   ur(y;p;));
and the fare p and the trac scenario  are treated as parameters. VIP (3.26) can be equivalently
rewritten in the following parametric general equation:
0 2 H(p;y;(!)) + NQ(y); a.e. ! 2 
; (3.27)
11for a vector-valued function H(p;y(p;);) and feasible set Q of y. Usually, functions Cr(y;pj;)
and tr(y;) are assumed to be continuously dierentiable for every , and hence the cost function
ur(y;pj;) is a continuously dierentiable function of y and H(p;y;) is also a continuous single-
valued mapping. Hence, solution y to parametric problem (3.27) can be written as y(p;) which
is a function of fare p and trac scenario .
Let us step back to the operators' problems at the rst stage, in which every operator makes
its decision on the fare charged at each route to maximize its expected revenue. From the
discussion on stochastic user equilibrium, we have that passenger ow yr(p;) on path r can be
implicitly solved by (3.26) or (3.27), and is a continuous function of p for every scenario . Then,
we assume that the proportion that passengers chooses operator i's service on path r 2 Rw for
traveling between OD pair w is a function of fw(y;pi
w;p i
w ) where p i
w are the fare structures
provided by operator i's rivals between OD pair w. In [45], these proportions are calculated
according to the well used logit-type model, and in a more general case, we might assume
that fw
 
y(p;);pi
w;p i
w ;

is a continuously dierentiable function of y, pi
w and p i
w for all OD
pair w, where this proportion only reects a passenger's attitude towards each operator's fare.
Consequently, with this proportion, we can estimate the number of passengers using operator
i's service as vi
w = fw
 
y(p;);pi
w;p i
w ;

qw. Then operator i's expected revenue function can
be written as
Ri(pi;p i) = E
"
X
w2W
fw
 
y(pi
w;p i
w ;);pi
w;p i
w ;

qwpi
w
#
; (3.28)
where pi =

pi
w
	
and p i =

p i
w
	
for all w 2 W, and E[] is taken with respect to the distribution
of the trac uncertainty . It should be noted that the operating cost does not appear in the
expression due to the assumption of xed service frequency. Thus, the two stage equilibrium
problem is: nd p =
 
p1; ;pM
and y() such that for i = 1;2;:::;M,
 
pi;y()

solves the
following problem:
min
pi
w2[0; pi
w];y()
E

P
w2W
fw
 
y(pi
w;p i
w ;);pi
w;p i
w ;

qwpi
w

s.t. 0 2 H(p;y(p;(!));(!)) + NQ(y(p;(!))); a.e. ! 2 
;
(3.29)
where  pi
w is the ceiling of operator i's fare pi
w on its route between OD w. From problem
(3.29), we have that the competition in the oligopolistic transit market can be modeled by an
SEPEC problem. In [45], a deterministic version of EPEC model is proposed for investigating
the competition in a deregulated transit network market.
Apart from the applications of the two stage SEPEC models discussed in this section, there
are some potential applications in transportation and economics [15, 21, 13, 28], internet service
problems [36] and airline revenue management problems [16].
4 Sample average approximation
In this section, we discuss a numerical method for solving the SEPEC problem (2.1). If the
random vector  has a nite discrete distribution and the distribution is known, then the problem
can be easily formulated as a deterministic EPEC for which existing numerical methods may be
readily applied to solve it [18]. To cover a broader spectrum of practical applications, here we
12assume that  satises a general distribution which could be continuous, and it is impossible to
obtain a closed form of E[fi(xi;x i;y;)] either because it is computationally too expensive or
the distribution function is unknown. However, it might be possible to obtain samples of  from
past data or computer simulation, and a particular numerical scheme we are looking at here
is the sample average approximation (SAA). Let 1; ;N be an independent and identically
distributed (iid) sampling of the random vector (!). We consider the following sample average
approximation of problem: nd xN := (xN
1 ;xN
2 ; ;xN
M)T 2 X1  X2    XM such that
min
xi2Xi
1
N
N P
n=1
fi(xi;xN
 i;yn;n) (4.30)
where yn, n = 1;2;:::;N, is a solution of the following variational inequality problem:
0 2 H
  
x;xN
 i

;yn;n
+ NQ(yn) (4.31)
H(x;y;) := (H1(x;y;); ;HK(x;y;))
T
and
NQ(y) := NQ1(y1)    NQK(yK):
We refer to (2.1) as the true (SEPEC) problem and (4.30) as the sample average approximation
problem. Since (4.31) has a unique solution, we may use the notation of the optimal value
function in (2.4) to reformulate (4.30)-(4.31) as follows: nd
 
xN
1 ; ;xN
M
T such that xi solves
min
xi2Xi
^ #N
i (xi;x i) := 1
N
N P
n=1
vi(xi;xN
 i;n): (4.32)
We call (4.32) the sample average approximation of the implicit Nash SEPEC (2.4).
Sample average approximation is a very popular method in stochastic programming, it is
known under various names such as Monte Carlo sampling, sample path optimization and
stochastic counterpart, see [27, 30, 34] for SAA in general stochastic programming and [5, 19, 41]
for recent applications of the method to stochastic equilibrium problems. Our focus in this sec-
tion is on the convergence of SAA problems described above to their true counterparts. Speci-
cally, if we obtain a Nash equilibrium or a Nash stationary point (to be dened shortly), denoted
by xN, from solving (4.30), we investigate the convergence of xN as sample size N increases.
Proposition 4.1 (Convergence of Nash equilibrium estimators) Let fxNg be a sequence
of Nash equilibria obtained from solving (4.30) and Assumption 2.1 holds. Then with probability
one an accumulation point of fxNg is a Nash equilibrium of the true problem (2.1).
The results depend on the Lipschitz continuity of vi (established in Lemma 2.1) rather than
the details of the second stage equilibrium. Therefore the proposition follows straightforwardly
from [41, Theorem 4.2 (b)]. We omit the details.
4.1 Nash stationary points
It is well known that the optimal value function of a parametric mathematical program with equi-
librium constraints (MPEC) is often nonconvex. In our context, this means that vi(xi;xN
 i;n)
13may be nonconvex in xi for xed xN
 i and n, and consequently we may obtain a local Nash
equilibrium or a Nash stationary point from solving the SAA problem (4.30). The concept of
stationary points are important in optimization as it provides some information of optimality.
This is particularly so in MPECs where obtaining a global optimal solution is often dicult
and consequently various of stationary points are investigated [13, 44]. The concept of Nash
stationary point is relatively new: it was introduced by Hu and Ralph [15].
We start with the denition. Based on Assumption 2.1, we have that the optimal value
function vi is usually not continuously dierentiable, and the concept of the generalized gradient
is needed to characterize the rst order optimality conditions. Here we use the Clarke generalized
gradient for the analysis which is popular and mathematically easy to handle. The Clarke
generalized gradient of the optimal value function vi(x;y;) w.r.t. x coincides with the usual
gradient at the points where vi(;y;) is strictly dierentiable.
Let v : IRn ! IRm be a locally Lipschitz continuous function. Recall that Clarke generalized
derivative of v at point x in direction d is dened as
vo(x;d) := limsup
y!x;t#0
v(y + td)   v(y)
t
:
v is said to be Clarke regular at x if the usual one sided directional derivative, denoted by v0(x;d),
exists for all d 2 IRn and vo(x;d) = v0(x;d). The Clarke generalized gradient (also known as
Clarke subdierential) is dened as
@v(x) := f : Td  vo(x;d)g:
See [4, Chapter 2].
In Lemma 2.1, we have shown that under some appropriate conditions vi(xi;x i;), i =
1; ;M, is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. xi with integrable Lipschitz modulus. This implies that
E[vi(xi;x i;)] is also Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. xi and hence @xiE[vi(xi;x i;)] is well dened,
see [32]. We characterize the rst order equilibrium condition of (2.1) at a Nash equilibrium in
terms of the Clarke generalized gradients as follows:
0 2 @xiE[vi(xi;x i;)] + NXi(xi); i = 1; ;M: (4.33)
Here and later on, the addition of the sets is in the sense of Minkowski. We call a point x
satisfying (4.33) a stochastic Nash-C-stationary point. Under some standard constraint quali-
cations, a Nash equilibrium is a Nash-C-stationary point. Conversely if vi is convex, then a
Nash-C-stationary point is also a Nash equilibrium.
Let us now consider the rst order necessary equilibrium condition for the SAA problem
(4.30) in terms of Clarke generalized gradient:
0 2 @xi#N
i (xi;x i) := @xi
 
1
N
N X
n=1
vi(xi;x i;n)
!
+ NXi(xi); i = 1; ;M: (4.34)
We call a point  xN satisfying (4.34) SAA Nash-C-stationary point. Our objective here is to
investigate the convergence SAA Nash-C-stationary point to its true counterpart.
For the simplicity of notation, we denote throughout this section the following.
A#(x) := @x1E[v1(x;)]    @xME[vM(x;)] (4.35)
14and
GX(x) := NX1(x1)    NXM(xM): (4.36)
The rst order equilibrium condition (4.33) can be written as
0 2 A#(x) + GX(x): (4.37)
Likewise, the rst order equilibrium condition (4.34) can be written as
0 2 A#N(x) + GX(x); (4.38)
where
A#N(x) := @x1
 
1
N
N X
n=1
v1(x;n)
!
   @xM
 
1
N
N X
n=1
vM(x;n)
!
: (4.39)
Let f xNg be a sequence of stationary points satisfying optimality condition of the SAA problem
(4.34) with sample size N. In what follows, we investigate the convergence of the sequence as
sample size N increases. We need the following technical results.
Lemma 4.1 Let F(x;) : IRm   ! IR be a continuous function, and X be a compact subset.
Assume that F(x;) is locally Lipschitz continuous with respect to x for almost every  with
modulus L(x;) which is bounded by a positive constant C. Then
lim
N!1
sup
x2X
H
 
@
 
1
N
N X
n=1
F(x;n)
!
;@E[F(x;)]
!
= 0 (4.40)
Proof. The assertion is a special case of a recently established result [20, Lemma 5.1]. We
include a proof for the completeness. For the simplicity of the notation, let
PN :=
1
N
N X
n=1
1n(!)
where
1n(!) :=
(
1; if (!) = n;
0; if (!) 6= n:
Then EPN[F(x;)] = 1
N
PN
n=1 F(x;n) and hence
@EPN[F(x;)] = @
 
1
N
N X
n=1
F(x;n)
!
:
Let fPN(x) = EPN[F(x;)] and fP(x) = E[F(x;)]. Under condition (a), both fPN(x) and fP(x)
are globally Lipschitz continuous, therefore the Clarke's generalized derivatives of fPN(x) and
fP(x), denoted by fo
PN(x;h) and fo
P(x;h) respectively, are well-dened for any xed nonzero
vector h 2 IRm, where
fo
PN(x;h) = limsup
x0!x;#0
1

 
fPN(x0 + h)   fPN(x0)

15and
fo
P(x;h) = limsup
x0!x;#0
1

 
fP(x0 + h)   fP(x0)

:
Our idea is to study the Hausdor distance H(@fPN(x);@fP(x)) through certain \distance"
of the Clarke generalized derivatives fo
PN(x;h) and fo
P(x;h). Let D1;D2 be two convex and
compact subsets of IRm. Let (D1;u) and (D2;u) denote the support functions of D1 and D2
respectively, where (Di;u) is dened as for i = 1 and 2
(Di;u) = sup
x2Di
uTx
for every u 2 IRm. Then
D(D1;D2) = max
kuk1
((D1;u)   (D2;u))
and
H(D1;D2) = max
kuk1
j(D1;u)   (D2;u)j:
The above relationships are known as H omander's formulae, see [3, Theorem II-18]. Applying
the second formula to our setting, we have
H(@fPN(x);@fP(x)) = sup
khk1
 (@fPN(x);h)   (@fPN(x);h)
 :
Using the relationship between Clarke's subdierential and Clarke's generalized derivative, we
have that fo
PN(x;h) = (@fPN(x);h) and fo
P(x;h) = (@fP(x);h): Consequently,
H(@fPN(x);@fP(x)) = sup
khk1

fo
P(x;h)   fo
PN(x;h)


= sup
khk1

 
 limsup
x0!x;#0
1

 
fP(x0 + h)   fP(x0)

  limsup
x0!x;#0
1

 
fPN(x0 + h)   fPN(x0)


 
:
Note that for any bounded sequence fang and fbng, we have
 
 limsup
n!1
an   limsup
n!1
bn
 
   limsup
n!1
jan   bnj: (4.41)
To see this, let fanjg be a subsequence such that limsupn!1 an = limnj!1 anj. Then
limsup
n!1
jan   bnj  limsup
nj!1
janj   bnjj
 limsup
nj!1
(anj   bnj)
= limsup
n!1
an + limsup
nj!1
( bnj)
 limsup
n!1
an + liminf
nj!1( bnj)
 limsup
n!1
an + liminf
n!1
( bn)
= limsup
n!1
an   limsup
n!1
bn:
Since an and bn are in a symmetric position, we have that
limsup
n!1
jan   bnj  limsup
n!1
bn   limsup
n!1
an:
16This veries (4.41). Using (4.41), we have
H(@fPN(x);@fP(x))  sup
khk1
limsup
x0!x;#0

 

1

 
fP(x0 + h)   fP(x0)

 
1

 
fPN(x0 + h)   fPN(x0)


 

= sup
khk1
limsup
x0!x;#0

 

Z

1

 
F(x0 + h;)   F(x0;)

d(P   PN)()
 

:
Since PN converges to P in distribution, and the integrand 1
(F(x0 + h;)   F(x0;)) is con-
tinuous w.r.t  and it is bounded by L, by virtue of [2, Theorem 2.1]
lim
N!1
sup
x2X
sup
khk1
limsup
x0!x;#0
 
 
Z

1

(F(x0 + h;)   F(x0;))d(P   PN)()
 
  = 0:
This completes the proof.
Let  : IRn  ! IR be a real valued function and  : 
 !   IRk a random vector dened
on probability space (
;F;P), let X be a subset of IRn and x 2 X. Recall that  is said to
be H-calm at x from above with modulus () and order  if (x;) is nite and there exists a
(measurable) function  :  ! R+, positive numbers  and  such that
(x0;)   (x;)  ()kx0   xk (4.42)
for all x0 2 X with kx0   xk   and almost every  2 , see [41].
Using Lemma 4.1 and the concept of H-calmness, we are ready to present one of the main
results in this section which state the uniform and exponential convergence of the subdierentials
of underlying functions in dening the Nash equilibrium conditions.
Theorem 4.1 Let fxNg be a sequence of SAA Nash-C-stationary points. Assume: (a) w.p.1
fxNg is contained in a compact subset X of X, (b) Assumption 2.1 holds, (c) the Lipschitz
modulus of vi(xi;x i;) w.r.t. xi, i = 1; ;M, is bounded by a positive constant C. Then
(i) w.p.1
lim
N!1
sup
x2X
H(A#N(x);A#(x)) = 0: (4.43)
(ii) Assume in addition that for every  2  and x i 2 X i: (d) vi(xi;x i;) is piecewise
twice continuously dierentiable w.r.t. xi, (e) vi(xi;x i;) is Clarke regular w.r.t. xi for
a.e.  2 , (f) the support set of  is bounded. Then for every small positive number
 > 0, there exist ^ c() > 0 and ^ () > 0, independent of N, such that
Prob

sup
x2X
D(A#N(x);A#(x))  

 ^ c()e ^ ()N (4.44)
for N suciently large.
Proof. Part (i). Observe that
H(A#N(x);A#(x)) 
M X
i=1
H(A#N
i (x);A#i(x))
17where A#N
i (x) = @xi

1
N
PN
n=1 vi(x;k)

and A#i(x) = @xiE[vi(x;)]: Under conditions (a)-(c),
it follows by Lemma 4.1 that
lim
N!1
sup
x2X
H(A#N
i (x);A#i(x)) = 0
w.p.1 for i = 1; ;M, which immediately yields (4.43).
Part (ii). Following the proof in [24, Proposition 3.4], we have the following equation
E[ (Av(x;);u)] =  (E[Av(x;)];u): (4.45)
On the other hand, we observe that it is easy to verify the following inequality
D(A#N(x);A#(x)) 
M X
i=1
D(A#N
i (x);A#i(x)):
By H omander's formulae [3, Theorem II-18],
D(A#N
i (x);A#i(x)) = max
kuk1
(A#N
i (x);u)   (A#i(x);u):
Since
A#N
i (x) 
1
N
N X
n=1
@xivi(x;n);
and (@xivi(x;n);u) = (vi)o
xi(x;n), then
(A#N
i (x);u) 
1
N
N X
n=1
(@xivi(x;n);u) 
1
N
N X
n=1
(vi)o
xi(x;n;u):
where fo
xi(x;u) denotes the Clarke generalized directional derivative of f w.r.t. xi at point x in
the direction u. Moreover, under conditions (e), it follows from [4, Theorem 2.7.2]
(A#i(x);u) = (#i)o
xi(x;u) = E

(vi)o
xi(x;;u)

:
Consequently, we have
sup
x2X
D(A#N(x);A#(x))  sup
x2X
M X
i=1
D(A#N
i (x);A#i(x))
 sup
x2X
max
kuk1
1
N
N X
n=1

(vi)o
xi(x;n;u)

  E

(vi)o
xi(x;;u)

:
In what follows, we show the uniform exponential convergence of the right hand side of the
above inequality. Observe that
k(vi)o
xi(x;;ui)k  k@xivi(x;)k  i():
Under condition (d), we can verify that
(vi)o
xi(x0;;u0
i)   (vi)o
xi(x;;ui)  ai()kx0   xk + i()ku0
i   uik:
18Let zi := (x;ui) and Zi := X  fui 2 IRmi : kuik  1g. The inequalities above shows that
(vi)o
xi(;n;) is H-calm from above on set Zi. Moreover, under Condition (f), the moment
generating function Mx(t) := E

et[ai()+i()]	
is nite valued for t close to 0. By virtue of [41,
Proposition 4.1], we have that for any i > 0, there exist positive constants ^ ci(i) and ^ i(i),
independent of N such that
Prob
(
sup
(x;u)2Zi
 
1
N
N X
n=1
(vi)o
xi(x;n;u)   E

(vi)o
xi(x;n;u)

 i
!)
 ^ ci(i)e N ^ i(i);
for i = 1;2; ;M. For any  > 0, let i > 0 be such that
PM
i=1 i < . Then, we can show that
for every small positive number  > 0, there exist ^ c() > 0 and ^ () > 0, independent of N, such
that
Prob
(
sup
x2X
max
kuk1
M X
i=1
1
N
N X
n=1

(vi)o
xi(x;n;u)

  E

(vi)o
xi(x;;u)

 
)
 ^ c()e ^ ()N; (4.46)
where ^ c() = M maxM
i=1 ^ ci(i) and ^ () = minM
i=1 ^ i(i). The conclusion follows.
In what follows, we translate the uniform convergence of the subdierential in Theorem
4.1 into the convergence of Nash-C-stationary points. We need a perturbation theorem on
generalized equation.
Consider the following generalized equation
0 2 G(x) + NC(x); (4.47)
where G(x) : C ! 2IRm
is a closed set-valued mapping, C is a closed convex subset of IRm. Let
~ G(x) be a perturbation of G(x) and we consider the perturbed equation
0 2 ~ G(x) + NC(x): (4.48)
Recall that a set-valued mapping F is said to be outer semicontinuous (osc for brevity) at
 x 2 IRn if limx! x F(x)  F( x) or equivalently limx! x D(F(x);F( x)) = 0; where
lim
x! xF(x) := fv 2 Rm : 9 seqences xk !  x;vk ! v with vk 2 F(xk)g:
The following lemma states that when D( ~ G(x));G(x)) is suciently small uniformly w.r.t x,
then the solution set of (4.48) is close to the solution set of (4.47).
Lemma 4.2 ([39]) Let W be a compact subset of C. Let X denote the set of solutions to (4.47)
in W and Y  denote the set of solutions to (4.48) in W. Assume that X and Y  are nonempty.
Then
(i) for any  > 0 there exists a  > 0 such that if supx2C D( ~ G(x);G(x)) <  and G is outer
semicontinuous in W, then D(Y ;X) < ;
(ii) for any  > 0 there exists a  > 0 such that if supx2C H( ~ G(x);G(x)) <  and ~ G(x) is also
outer semicontinuous in W, then H(Y ;X) < .
19Theorem 4.2 Let fxNg be a sequence of Nash-C-stationary points satisfying (4.34). If con-
ditions (a)-(c) of Theorem 4.1 hold, then w.p.1, an accumulation point of fxNg is a Nash-C-
stationary point of the true problem which satises the rst order necessary equilibrium condition
(4.33). If, in addition, conditions (d)-(f) of Theorem 4.1 are satised, then for every small pos-
itive number  > 0, there exist ^ c() > 0 and ^ () > 0, independent of N, such that
Prob

d(xN;X)  
	
 ^ c()e ^ ()N (4.49)
for N suciently large, where X denotes the set of Nash-C-stationary point of the true problem.
Proof. The conclusion follows straightforwardly from Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 4.2. We omit
the details.
Remark 4.1 The convergence results established here are stronger than those in our previous
work [41]. To see this, recall that in [41] we considered the so-called weak Nash equilibrium
conditions for a one stage stochastic Nash equilibrium problem:
0 2 E[@xivi(xi;x i;)] + NXi(xi); i = 1; ;M; (4.50)
where vi is player i's objective function and E[@xivi(xi;x i;)] denotes Aumann's integral of
Clarke subdierential @xivi(xi;x i;) [1]. Condition (4.50) is weaker than (4.33) in that
@xiE[vi(xi;x i;)]  E[@xivi(xi;x i;)];
see [4, Theorem 2.7.2]. The corresponding rst order optimality conditions for the SAA problem
considered there are:
0 2
 
1
N
N X
n=1
@xivi(xi;x i;n)
!
+ NXi(xi); i = 1; ;M: (4.51)
Since
@xi
 
1
N
N X
n=1
vi(xi;x i;n)
!

 
1
N
N X
n=1
@xivi(xi;x i;n)
!
;
condition (4.51) is also weaker than (4.34). Roughly speaking, the convergence results established
in [41] are about weak Nash-C-stationary point dened through (4.51) to its true counterpart
dened through (4.50), whereas the convergence results in Theorem 4.2 are for normal SAA
Nash-C-stationary point dened by (4.51) to its true counterpart which satises (4.33).
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we discuss a two stage stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints
model and present a few source problems to motivate the model. The model may be extended
by including some terms either in the objective or in the constraints which reect risks such as
variance, conditional value at risk [29], chance constraints [26] or certain dominance constraints
[6]. To solve the two stage stochastic equilibrium model, we propose to apply the well known
sample average approximation method. The exponential rate of convergence means that the
20sample size will not be very large to obtain a reasonably reliable solution. In the case when
the distribution of  is nite and known, SAA is not needed. The true problem may be solved
through decomposition method or stochastic approximation method, see [26, 37] for stochastic
bilevel programs. Finally, we note that the EPEC model is often nonconvex and therefore it
would be practically interesting but challenging to identify a Nash equilibrium from a set of
obtained Nash stationary points.
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